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Abstract
This article proposes the axiomatizations of contingency logics of various nat-
ural classes of neighborhood frames. In particular, by defining a suitable canonical
neighborhood function, we give sound and complete axiomatizations of mono-
tone contingency logic and regular contingency logic, thereby answering two open
questions raised by Bakhtiari, van Ditmarsch, and Hansen. The canonical function
is inspired by a function proposed by Kuhn in 1995. We show that Kuhn’s function
is actually equal to a related function originally given by Humberstone.
Keywords: contingency logic, neighborhood semantics, axiomatization, monotone lo-
gic, regular logic
1 Introduction
Compared to standard modal logic, non-standard modal logics usually have many dis-
advantages, such as weak expressivity, weak frame definability, which brings about
non-triviality of axiomatizations. Contingency logic is such a logic [15, 4, 9, 12, 19,
18, 17, 7, 8]. Contingency logic is concerned with the study of principles of reason-
ing involving contingency, noncontingency, and related notions. Since it was intro-
duced, contingency logic has mainly been investigated within the framework of Kripke
semantics. However, a known pain for axiomatizing this logic over various Kripke
frames is the absence of axioms characterizing frame properties. Moreover, although
there have been many results on the axiomatizations of contingency logic which are
extensions of minimal logicK∆, there have been no yet much axiomatizations weaker
than K∆, for which we need neighborhood semantics. Since it was independently
proposed by Scott and Montague in 1970 [16, 14], neighborhood semantics has been a
standard semantical tool for handling non-normal modal logics [3].
A neighborhood semantics of contingency logic is proposed in [6]. According to
the interpretation, a formulaϕ is noncontingent, if and only if the proposition expressed
by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated state, or the complement of the proposition
expressed by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated state. This interpretation is in line
with the philosophical intuition of noncontingency, viz. necessarily true or necessarily
false. It is shown that contingency logic is less expressive than standard modal logic
over various neighborhood model classes, and many neighborhood frame properties
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are undefinable in contingency logic. This brings about the difficulties in axiomatizing
this logic over various neighborhood frames.
To our knowledge, only the classical contingency logic, i.e. the minimal system
of contingency logic under neighborhood semantics, is presented in the literature [6].
It is left as two open questions in [1] what the axiomatizations of monotone contin-
gency logic and regular contingency logic are. In this paper, we will answer these two
questions.
Besides, we also propose other proof systems up to the minimal Kripke contingency
logic, and show their completeness with respect to the corresponding neighborhood
frames. This will give a complete diagram which includes 8 systems, as [3, Fig. 8.1]
did for standard modal logic. It is a sub-diagram of a larger diagram of 16 logics, due
to the introduction of a property of being closed under complements.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some
basics of contingency logic, such as its language, neighborhood semantics, axioms and
rules. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the completeness of proof systems mentioned in
Sec. 2, with or without a special axiom. The completeness proofs rely on the use of
canonical neighborhood functions. In Sec. 3, a simple canonical function is needed,
while in Sec. 4 we need a more complex canonical function, which is inspired by a
crucial function λ used in a Kripke completeness proof in the literature. We further
reflect on this λ in Section 5, and show it is in fact equal to a related but complicated
function originally given by Humberstone. We conclude with some discussions in
Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we fix P to be a nonempty set of propositional variables. The
language L(∆) of contingency logic is defined recursively as follows:
ϕ ::= p ∈ P | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∆ϕ.
∆ϕ is read “it is noncontingent that ϕ”. The contingency operator∇ abbreviates ¬∆.
It does not matter which one of ∆ and ∇ is taken as primitive. We use ϕ ∈ L(∆) to
mean that ϕ is an L(∆)-formula, and we always leave out the reference to L(∆) and
simply say that ϕ is a formula.
The neighborhood semantics of L(∆) is interpreted on neighborhood models. We
say that M = 〈S,N, V 〉 is a neighborhood model if S is a nonempty set of states,
N : S → P(P(S)) is a neighborhood function, and V is a valuation assigning a set
V (p) ⊆ S to each propositional variable p. A neighborhood frame is a neighborhood
model without valuations.
Given a neighborhood modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉 and a state s ∈ S, the semantics of
ϕ ∈ L(∆) is defined recursively as follows [6],
M, s  p ⇐⇒ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s) or S\ϕM ∈ N(s)
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where ϕM = {s ∈ S | M, s  ϕ} is the truth set of ϕ (i.e. the proposition expressed
by ϕ) inM. Formula ϕ is valid in a frame F , notation: F  ϕ, if for all modelsM
based on F and all s inM, we have thatM, s  ϕ; ϕ is valid on a class K of frames,
notation: K  ϕ, if for all F in K, we have that F  ϕ. Notions of validity of a set
of formulas in a frame and on a class of frames are defined similarly. Moreover, given
a class K of frames, we say K is definable in L(∆), if there is a Γ ⊆ L(∆) such that
F  Γ iff F ∈ K.
Definition 1 (Neighborhood frame properties). Let F = 〈S,N〉 be a neighborhood
frame. For every s ∈ S and everyX,Y ⊆ S:
(m): N(s) is supplemented, or closed under supersets, if X ∈ N(s) and X ⊆
Y ⊆ S implies Y ∈ N(s).
(c): N(s) is closed under intersections, if X,Y ∈ N(s) impliesX ∩ Y ∈ N(s).
(n): N(s) contains the unit, if S ∈ N(s).
(z): N(s) is closed under complements, if X ∈ N(s) implies S\X ∈ N(s).1
Frame F = 〈S,N〉 (and the corresponding model) possesses such a property P, if
N(s) has the property P for each s ∈ S, and we call the frame (resp. the model) P-
frame (resp. P-model). Especially, a frame is called quasi-filter, if it possesses (m) and
(c); a frame is called filter, if it has also (n). The property (z) is needed for the follow-
ing soundness and completeness results, and it provides us a new perspective (see [5])
for the neighborhood semantics of L(∆). All properties listed above are shown to be
undefinable in L(∆) [6, Prop. 7]. In contrast, they are definable in standard modal
logic L().2 The proofs of the first three can be found in [3, Thm. 7.5, Thm. 9.2], and
the proof of the last one is similar to [5, Prop. 5].
Fact 2. The frame properties on the left are respectively defined by the formulas on the
right:
(m) (p ∧ q)→ (p ∧q) (c) (p ∧q)→ (p ∧ q)
(n) ⊤ (z) p→ ¬p
Recall the axioms and rules in 8 classical modal systems and the classes of frames
determining them listed below, see e.g. [3, Chap. 8].
TAUT all instances of propositional tautologies
M (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ψ) MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
C (ϕ ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ) RE
ϕ↔ ψ
ϕ↔ ψ
N ⊤
1The property (z) was introduced in [6, Def. 3], named ‘(c)’ therein.
2L() extends the language of propositional logic with the necessity operator , formally defined as
follows:
ϕ ::= p ∈ P | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ,
where the neighborhood semantics of  is
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s).
3
systems frame classes
E = TAUT+MP+ RE all
M(= EM) = E+M (m)
EC = E+ C (c)
EN = E+ N (n)
R(= EMC) =M+ C quasi-filters = (mc)
EMN =M+ N (mn)
ECN = EC+ N (cn)
K(= EMCN) = R+ N filters = (mcn)
Our discussions will mainly be based on the following axioms and rules.
TAUT all instances of propositional tautologies ∆N ∆⊤
∆Equ ∆ϕ↔ ∆¬ϕ MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
∆M ∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ) RE∆
ϕ↔ ψ
∆ϕ↔ ∆ψ
∆C ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ)
We will show that the following systems are sound and strongly complete with
respect to their corresponding frame classes.
systems frame classes
E
∆ = EZ∆ = TAUT+∆Equ+MP+ RE∆ all (also (z))
M
∆(= EM∆) = E∆ +∆M (m)
ECZ
∆ = E∆ +∆C (cz)
EN
∆ = ENZ∆ = E∆ +∆N (n)(also (nz))
R
∆(= EMC∆) =M∆ +∆C quasi-filters = (mc)
EMN
∆ =M∆ +∆N (mn)
ECNZ
∆ = ECZ∆ +∆N (cnz)
K
∆(= EMCN∆) = R∆ +∆N filters = (mcn)
The notion of theorems in a system is defined as normal.
By comparison, one can easily see that almost all of ∆-systems and the corres-
ponding -systems mentioned above are determined by the same class of frames, but
with two exceptions: even though EC and ECN are respectively determined by the
class of (c)-frames and the class of (cn)-frames, we have only ∆-systems which are
respectively determined by the class of (cz)-frames and the class of (cnz)-frames, that
is — ECZ∆ and ECNZ∆. We do not know whether there are axiomatizations of
contingency logics over (c)-frames and over (cn)-frames.
Given a -logic L (that is, logic in L()), one can define a ∆-logic, denoted L∆,
as L∆ = {ϕ ∈ L(∆) | ϕ⋆ ∈ L}, where ϕ⋆ is defined inductively, with (∆ϕ)⋆ =
ϕ⋆ ∨ ¬ϕ⋆. In other words, L∆ proves exactly those L(∆)-formulas whose ⋆-
translations are provable in L. It is easy to show that if L is the -logic of some class
of frames K (in symbol, L = Th(K)), that is, L is the set of L()-formulas that are
valid in K, then L∆ is the ∆-logic of K (in symbol, L∆ = Th∆(K)). Note that one
cannot obtain the axiomatization of L∆ from the axiomatization of L, since there is no
translation function from L() to L(∆).
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Recall that Def. 1 listed 4 frame properties, which constitutes 16 = 24 different
combinations of such properties. Since every frame class K can define a ∆-logic,
namely Th∆(K), we should have 16 different ∆-logics. In this paper, we axiomatize
10∆-logics as listed above, and leave the axiomatizations of the remaining 6∆-logics
open. We will defer a summary of 16 logics with some remarks to the end of Sec. 4.
In what follows, we also use s∆M to denote ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ), which is clearly
‘stronger’ than ∆M, ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ). Note that s∆M is equivalent to
∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) → ∆ϕ in E∆, since they are interderivable with the rule of ∆-monotony
ϕ→ ψ
∆ϕ→ ∆ψ
in the system in question.
Let Fall denote the class of all frames, Fm denote the class of (m)-frames, Fc denote
the class of (c)-frames, and similarly for other properties.
Proposition 3. We have the following validities and invalidities:
(i) Fn  ∆N.
(ii) Fm  ∆M.
(iii) Fcz  ∆C.
(iv) Fmc  ∆C.
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(v) Fc 2 ∆C.
(vi) Fcn 2 ∆C.
(vii) Fmcn 2 s∆M.
(viii) Fm 2 s∆M.
(ix) Fmc 2 s∆M.
(x) Fmn 2 s∆M.
(xi) Fmz  s∆M.
Proof.
(i) Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be an (n)-model and s ∈ S. By (n), S ∈ N(s), that is,
⊤M ∈ N(s), and thus ⊤M ∈ N(s) or S\⊤M ∈ N(s), and henceM, s  ∆⊤.
By the arbitrariness ofM and s, we conclude that Fn  ∆N.
(ii) Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be an (m)-model and s ∈ S. Suppose that M, s  ∆ϕ,
then ϕM ∈ N(s) or (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s). If ϕM ∈ N(s), then by (m), ϕM∪ψM ∈
N(s), which impliesM, s  ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ); if (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s), then similarly, we
can obtainM, s  ∆(¬ϕ∨χ). Either case gives usM, s  ∆(ϕ∨ψ)∨∆(¬ϕ∨
χ), as required.
3It is worth remarking that in the case of (c)-frames, we need the property (z) to provide the validity of
∆C (see the proof of item (iii) in this proposition); by comparison, in the case of quasi-filters, we do not
need (z), since the validity of∆C is now guaranteed by (c) and (m) together.
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(iii) Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a (cz)-model and s ∈ S. Suppose M, s  ∆ϕ and
M, s  ∆ψ, to show M, s  ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ). From M, s  ∆ϕ it follows that
ϕM ∈ N(s) or S\ϕM ∈ N(s). Using (z), we can infer ϕM ∈ N(s). Similarly,
fromM, s  ∆ψ we can obtain ψM ∈ N(s). Now an application of (c) gives
us ϕM ∩ ψM ∈ N(s), that is, (ϕ ∧ ψ)M ∈ N(s), and thusM, s  ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ).
(iv) Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a quasi-filter model and s ∈ S. Suppose that M, s 
∆ϕ ∧∆ψ, then ϕM ∈ N(s) or (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s), and ψM ∈ N(s) or (¬ψ)M ∈
N(s). Consider the following three cases:
– ϕM ∈ N(s) and ψM ∈ N(s). By (c), we obtain ϕM ∩ ψM ∈ N(s), i.e.
(ϕ ∧ ψ)M ∈ N(s), which givesM, s  ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ).
– (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s). By (m), we infer (¬ϕ)M ∪ (¬ψ)M ∈ N(s), i.e. (¬(ϕ ∧
ψ))M ∈ N(s), which impliesM, s  ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ).
– (¬ψ)M ∈ N(s). Similar to the second case, we can derive that M, s 
∆(ϕ ∧ ψ).
(v) Consider an instance of ∆C: ∆p ∧ ∆¬p → ∆(p ∧ ¬p) and a model M =
〈S,N, V 〉 where S = {s, t}, N(s) = {{s}}, N(t) = ∅, and V (p) = {s}.
It should be obvious that M is a (c)-model. On the other hand, since pM =
{s} ∈ N(s), we haveM, s  ∆p, also, as S\(¬p)M = pM ∈ N(s), we infer
M, s  ∆¬p; however, (p∧¬p)M = ∅ /∈ N(s) and S\(p∧¬p)M = S /∈ N(s),
thusM, s 2 ∆(p∧¬p). Therefore,M, s 2 ∆p∧∆¬p→ ∆(p∧¬p). We have
thus found a (c)-model which falsifies an instance of∆C, and it can be concluded
that Fc 2 ∆C.
(vi) Consider an instance of∆C:∆p∧∆q → ∆(p∧q) and a modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉
where S = {s, t, u}, N(s) = {{s}, {s, t}, S}, N(t) = N(u) = {S}, and
V (p) = {s, t}, V (q) = {t, u}. It should be clear thatM is a (cn)-model. Since
pM = {s, t} ∈ N(s), we haveM, s  ∆p; since S\qM = {s} ∈ N(s), thus
M, s  ∆q. However, (p ∧ q)M = {t} /∈ N(s) and S\(p ∧ q)M = {s, u} /∈
N(s), thus M, s 2 ∆(p ∧ q). Therefore,M, s 2 ∆p ∧ ∆q → ∆(p ∧ q). We
have thus found a (cn)-model which falsifies an instance of ∆C, and it can be
concluded that Fcn 2 ∆C.
(vii) Consider the following instance of s∆M: ∆p → ∆(p ∨ q), and a modelM =
〈S,N, V 〉 where S = {s, t, u}, N(s) = {{t, u}, S},N(t) = N(u) = {S}, and
V (p) = {s}, V (q) = {t}. One may easily verify that M is an (mcn)-model.
However,M, s 2 ∆p → ∆(p ∨ q): on one hand, as (¬p)M = {t, u} ∈ N(s),
we haveM, s  ∆p; on the other hand, since (p ∨ q)M = {s, t} /∈ N(s) and
(¬(p ∨ q))M = {u} /∈ N(s), thusM, s 2 ∆(p ∨ q).
(viii)-(x) Follows directly from item (vii), since (mcn)-models are also (m)-models, (mc)-
models and (mn)-models.
(xi) Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be an (mz)-model and s ∈ S. Suppose thatM, s  ∆ϕ,
to show that M, s  ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ). By supposition, we have ϕM ∈ N(s) or
6
(¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s). By (z), it follows that ϕM ∈ N(s). Then by (m), it follows
that ϕM∪ψM ∈ N(s), viz. (ϕ∨ψ)M ∈ N(s), and thereforeM, s  ∆(ϕ∨ψ).
Corollary 4 (Soundness). The aforementioned 10 logics are sound with respect to their
corresponding class of frames.
• E∆ = EZ∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fall) ⊆ Th∆(Fz)
• M∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fm)
• ECZ∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fcz)
• EN∆ = ENZ∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fn) ⊆ Th∆(Fnz)
• R∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fmc)
• EMN∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fmn)
• ECNZ∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fcnz)
• K∆ ⊆ Th∆(Fmcn)
From the next section, we will start to show the completeness results of these sys-
tems, with the aid of canonical neighborhoodmodel constructions. As one will see, all
the above systems may not be handled by a uniform canonical neighborhood function;
instead, we need to distinguish systems excluding axiom∆M from those including it.
Given a system Λ and the set SΛ of all maximal consistent sets for Λ, let |ϕ|Λ be
the proof set of ϕ relative to Λ, in symbol, |ϕ|Λ = {s ∈ S
Λ | ϕ ∈ s}.4 It is easy to
show that |¬ϕ|Λ = SΛ\|ϕ|Λ and |ϕ∧ψ|Λ = |ϕ|Λ∩|ψ|Λ. We always omit the subscript
Λ when it is clear from the context.
3 Systems excluding ∆M
Given a proof system, a standard method of showing its completeness under neighbor-
hood semantics is constructing the canonical neighborhoodmodel, where one essential
part is the definition of canonical neighborhood function.
Definition 5. Let Λ be a system excluding∆M. A tupleMΛ = 〈SΛ, NΛ, V Λ〉 is the
canonical neighborhood model for Λ, if
• SΛ = {s | s is a maximal consistent set for Λ},
• NΛ(s) = {|ϕ| | ∆ϕ ∈ s},
• V Λ(p) = |p|.
Notice that thanks to axiom∆Equ, the functionNΛ in the above definition has the
property (z), that is, for all s ∈ SΛ andX ⊆ SΛ, ifX ∈ NΛ(s), then SΛ\X ∈ NΛ(s).
4The terminology ‘the proof set’ can be found on [3, p. 57].
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Theorem 6. [6, Thm. 1, Thm. 2] E∆ = EZ∆ is strongly complete with respect to the
class of all neighborhood frames and also w.r.t. the class of all (z)-frames. Therefore,
E
∆ = Th∆(Fall) = EZ
∆ = Th∆(Fz).
In what follows, we will extend the canonical model construction to all systems
excluding∆M listed above.
Theorem 7. ECZ∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of all (cz)-frames.
Proof. By Thm. 6, it suffices to show that NΛ possesses (c). This is guaranteed by
axiom ∆C: suppose X ∈ NΛ(s) and Y ∈ NΛ(s), then by definition of NΛ, X =
|ϕ| ∈ NΛ(s) and Y = |ψ| ∈ NΛ(s) for some ϕ and ψ, thus ∆ϕ ∈ s and ∆ψ ∈ s,
which implies ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ s because of axiom ∆C, and therefore |ϕ ∧ ψ| ∈ NΛ(s),
that is, X ∩ Y ∈ NΛ(s).
Theorem 8. EN∆ = ENZ∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of all (n)-
frames and also w.r.t. the class of all (nz)-frames. Therefore, EN∆ = Th∆(Fn) =
ENZ
∆ = Th∆(Fnz).
Proof. By Thm. 6, it suffices to show that NΛ possesses the property (n). This is
immediate due to ∆N and the definition of NΛ: since ⊢ ∆⊤, we have that for all
s ∈ SΛ, ∆⊤ ∈ s, and then |⊤| ∈ NΛ(s), that is, Sc ∈ NΛ(s).
Theorem 9. ECNZ∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of all (cnz)-
frames.
Proof. By Thm. 6, it suffices to show thatNΛ has the properties (c) and (n). Property
(c) is provided by axiom∆C (see the proof of Thm. 7), and (n) is warranted by axiom
∆N (see the proof of Thm. 8).
4 Systems including ∆M
In this section, we show that the systems including∆M listed above are strongly com-
plete with respect to the corresponding frame classes. For this, we construct the canon-
ical neighborhood model for any system extendingM∆, where the crucial definition
is the canonical neighborhood function. The definition of NΛ below is inspired by a
function λ introduced in [12].5
Definition 10. Let Λ be a system extendingM∆. A tripleMΛ = 〈SΛ, NΛ, V Λ〉 is a
canonical neighborhood model for Λ, if
• SΛ = {s | s is a maximal consistent set for Λ},
• For each s ∈ SΛ, |ϕ| ∈ NΛ(s) iff∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ,
• For each p ∈ P, V Λ(p) = |p|.
5The difference between NΛ and λ lies in the codomains: NΛ’s codomain is P(P(SΛ)), whereas λ’s
is P(L(∆)).
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We need to show that NΛ is well-defined.
Lemma 11. Let s ∈ SΛ as defined in Def. 10. If |ϕ| = |ϕ′|, then (∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈
s for every ψ) iff (∆(ϕ′ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ).
Proof. Suppose that |ϕ| = |ϕ′|, then ⊢ ϕ↔ ϕ′, then for every ψ, ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ ↔ ϕ′ ∨ ψ.
By RE∆, we have ⊢ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ ∆(ϕ′ ∨ ψ), thus (for every ψ, ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s) iff
(for every ψ,∆(ϕ′ ∨ ψ) ∈ s).
Def. 10 does not specify the function NΛ completely; besides the sets of the form
|ϕ| that satisfy this definition, NΛ(s) may contain other sets X ⊆ SΛ that are not of
the form |ϕ| for any L(∆)-formula ϕ. Therefore, each logic under consideration has
many canonical models.
Lemma 12. LetMΛ be an arbitrary canonical model for any system extendingM∆.
Then for all ϕ ∈ L(∆), for all s ∈ SΛ, we have MΛ, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s, i.e.
ϕM
Λ
= |ϕ|.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The base case and Boolean cases are straightforward by
Def. 10 and induction hypothesis. The only nontrivial case is∆ϕ.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that ∆ϕ ∈ s but MΛ, s 2 ∆ϕ. Then by induction
hypothesis, we obtain |ϕ| /∈ NΛ(s), and SΛ\|ϕ| /∈ NΛ(s), i.e. |¬ϕ| /∈ NΛ(s). Thus
∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) /∈ s for some ψ, and ∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ) /∈ s for some χ. Using axiom ∆M, we
obtain∆ϕ /∈ s: a contradiction.
Conversely, assume thatMΛ, s  ∆ϕ, to show that ∆ϕ ∈ s. By assumption and
induction hypothesis, we have |ϕ| ∈ NΛ(s), or SΛ\|ϕ| ∈ NΛ(s), i.e. |¬ϕ| ∈ NΛ(s).
If |ϕ| ∈ NΛ(s), then for every ψ, ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s. In particular, ∆ϕ ∈ s; if |¬ϕ| ∈
NΛ(s), then by a similar argument, we obtain ∆¬ϕ ∈ s, thus ∆ϕ ∈ s. Therefore,
∆ϕ ∈ s.
Given a system Λ extending M∆, the minimal canonical model for Λ, denoted
MΛ0 = 〈S
Λ, NΛ0 , V
Λ〉, is defined where NΛ0 (s) = {|ϕ| | ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ}.
Note that MΛ0 is not necessarily supplemented. Thus we need to define a notion of
supplementation, which comes from [3].
Definition 13. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a neighborhoodmodel. The supplementation of
M, denotedM+, is a triple 〈S,N+, V 〉, where for each s ∈ S, N+(s) is the superset
closure of N(s), i.e. for every s ∈ S,
N+(s) = {X ⊆ S | Y ⊆ X for some Y ∈ N(s)}.
Intuitively,M+ differs fromM only in that N+(s) contains every proposition inM
that includes any proposition in N(s).
It is easy to see thatM+ is supplemented. Moreover, N(s) ⊆ N+(s). The proof
below is a routine work.
Proposition 14. Let M be a neighborhood model. If M possesses the property (c),
then so doesM+; ifM possesses the property (n), then so doesM+.
9
We will denote the supplementation ofMΛ0 by (M
Λ
0 )
+ = 〈SΛ, (NΛ0 )
+, V Λ〉. By
definition of (NΛ0 )
+, (MΛ0 )
+ is an (m)-model. To demonstrate the completeness of
any system extendingM∆ with respect to the class of (m)-frames, we need only to
show that (MΛ0 )
+ is a canonical neighborhood model for any system extendingM∆.
That is,
Lemma 15. For each s ∈ SΛ,
|ϕ| ∈ (NΛ0 )
+(s) ⇐⇒ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ.
Proof. ‘⇐=’: immediate by NΛ0 (s) ⊆ (N
Λ
0 )
+(s) for each s ∈ SΛ and the definition
of NΛ0 .
‘=⇒’: Suppose that |ϕ| ∈ (NΛ0 )
+(s), to show that ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ. By
supposition,X ⊆ |ϕ| for some X ∈ NΛ0 (s). Then there is a χ such that |χ| = X , and
thus∆(χ∨ψ) ∈ s for every ψ, in particular∆(χ∨ϕ∨ψ) ∈ s. From |χ| ⊆ |ϕ| follows
that ⊢ χ → ϕ, thus ⊢ χ ∨ ϕ ∨ ψ ↔ ϕ ∨ ψ, and hence ⊢ ∆(χ ∨ ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ)
by RE∆. Therefore∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ.
By Lemma 12 and Lemma 15, we have
Lemma 16. For all ϕ ∈ L(∆), for all s ∈ SΛ, we have (MΛ0 )
+, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s,
i.e. ϕ(M
Λ
0 )
+
= |ϕ|.
With a routine work, we obtain
Theorem 17. M∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of (m)-frames.
We are now in a position to deal with the strong completeness ofR∆.
Proposition 18. For any system Λ extending R∆, the minimal canonical modelMΛ0
has the property (c). Hence, its supplementation (MΛ0 )
+ is an (mc)-model.
Proof. Suppose X ∈ NΛ0 (s) and Y ∈ N
Λ
0 (s), to show that X ∩ Y ∈ N
Λ
0 (s). By
supposition, there existϕ andχ such thatX = |ϕ| and Y = |χ|, and then∆(ϕ∨ψ) ∈ s
for everyψ, and∆(χ∨ψ) ∈ s for everyψ. Using axiom∆C, we infer∆((ϕ∧χ)∨ψ) ∈
s for every ψ. Therefore, |ϕ ∧ χ| ∈ NΛ0 (s), i.e. X ∩ Y ∈ N
Λ
0 (s). Thus M
Λ
0 has
the property (c). Then it follows that (MΛ0 )
+ also possesses the property (mc) from
Prop. 14.
The results below are now immediate, due to Lemma 16 and Prop. 18.
Theorem 19. R∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of quasi-filters.
Now for EMN∆.
Proposition 20. For any system Λ extending EMN∆, the minimal canonical model
MΛ0 has the property (n). Hence, its supplementation (M
Λ
0 )
+ is an (mn)-model.
Proof. Let s ∈ SΛ. By axiom∆N, we have∆⊤ ∈ s. This implies that∆(⊤ ∨ ψ) ∈ s
for every ψ. Then |⊤| ∈ NΛ0 (s), and thus S ∈ N
Λ
0 (s). We have now shown thatM
Λ
0
has the property (n). Then it follows that (MΛ0 )
+ is an (mn)-model from Prop. 14.
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By Prop. 20 and Lemma 16, it follows immediately that
Theorem 21. EMN∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of (mn)-frames.
Finally, forK∆. For any system Λ ⊇ K∆, we have Λ ⊇ R∆ and Λ ⊇ EMN∆.
By Prop. 18, (MΛ0 )
+ has the property (c); by Prop. 20, (MΛ0 )
+ has the property (n);
by the definition of (NΛ0 )
+, (MΛ0 )
+ has the property (m). Therefore, (MΛ0 )
+ is a
filter. Then combining Lemma 16, we conclude that
Theorem 22. K∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of filters.
Remark 23. It may be natural to ask whether the functionNΛ in Def. 10 (or the min-
imal NΛ0 ) work for systems excluding ∆M, e.g. E
∆. We think the answer is negative,
since the truth lemma (Lemma 12) indeed used the axiom∆M.
We conclude this section with a diagram and some remarks. By constructing coun-
termodels, we can obtain the following cubes, which summarize the deductive powers
of the 16 logics mentioned in this paper. Among these systems, E∆ = EZ∆ is the
weakest system, and KZ∆ is the strongest system. An arrow from a system S1 to
another S2 means that S2 is deductively stronger than S1. This is in line with the case
of classical modal logics, cf. e.g. [3, Fig. 8.1].
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E
∆ = EZ∆
EC
∆
ECZ
∆
M
∆(= EM∆)
R
∆(= EMC∆)
EN
∆ = ENZ∆
ECN
∆
ECNZ
∆
EMN
∆
K
∆(= EMCN∆)
KZ
∆(= EMCNZ∆)RZ∆ = (EMCZ∆)
EMNZ
∆MZ
∆(= EMZ∆)
Remark 24. Let Z denoteϕ→ ¬ϕ.
1. In this paper, among 16 logics in the above diagram, 10 logics were axiomatized
(labeled with blue), and axiomatizations of the remaining 6 logics are open. Our
conjecture is that if we replace∆M in the axiomatizations of logics on the second
level with s∆M, namely ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ), or equivalently ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) → ∆ϕ,
then we will obtain the axiomatizations of logics on the third (topmost) level.
2. S∆ ⊆ SZ∆ holds for any classical modal logics S. This is because for any
classes of frames K and K′, if S∆ = Th∆(K) and SZ
∆ = Th∆(K
′), then K′ ⊆
K. For instance, although we do not know yet what the axiomatizations of logics
EC
∆ andECN∆ are, we do knowEC∆ ⊆ ECZ∆ andECN∆ ⊆ ECNZ∆,
since Fcz ⊆ Fc and Fcnz ⊆ Fcn.
3. However, the equation S∆ = SZ∆ does not hold for any classical modal lo-
gics S, but only holds for the cases when S = E or S = EN (in comparison,
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E 6= EZ and EN 6= ENZ as is easily verified). This may be explained with
help of a notion of ‘c-variation’ introduced in [5, Def. 8], which we call now
‘complementation’, for the sake of reference.
Given a neighborhood functionN , we define its complementationNz as follows:
Nz(s) = {X ⊆ S | X ∈ N(s) or S\X ∈ N(s)}.
Given F = 〈S,N〉 and M = 〈S,N, V 〉, put Fz = 〈S,Nz〉 and Mz =
〈S,Nz , V 〉. Then one may easily verify that for every ϕ ∈ L(∆), for every
s ∈ S, M, s  ϕ iff Mz, s  ϕ. Consequently, Th∆(F) = Th∆(Fz). There-
fore, if K is a class of frames and we denote Kz = {Fz | F ∈ K}, then
Th∆(K) = Th∆(K
z), and K ⊆ Kz . Note that the complementation of a frame
is a (z)-frame: (Fall)
z = Fz = Fall (the ⊆ is obvious, for the ⊇ part, notice
that Fall ⊆ (Fall)z), and the complementation of an (n)-frame is an (nz)-frame:
(Fn)
z = Fnz = Fn. Therefore, E
∆ = EZ∆ (recall that E∆ = Th∆(Fall) and
EZ
∆ = Th∆(Fz), see Thm. 6; and Fall = Fz), and similarly EN
∆ = ENZ∆.
This explains why at the bottom of the cube of ∆-theories we did not have the
difference between the logics with and without Z. But the complementation of
a (c)-frame is not necessarily a (c)-frame,6 hence not always a (cz)-frame. In
fact, as shown in items (iii) and (v) of Prop. 3, the class of (c)-frames and the
class of (cz)-frames can be distinguished by ∆C, that is, ∆C ∈ Th∆(Fcz) but
∆C /∈ Th∆(Fc), and thus EC∆ 6= ECZ∆. Similarly, ECN∆ 6= ECNZ∆.
4. Although we have no idea yet about what the axiomatizations of logics on the
third level exactly are, we do know that the logics on that level differ from the lo-
gics on the second level. Indeed, the smallest logic on the third level,MZ∆, con-
tains s∆M (since s∆M ∈ Th∆(Fmz) by item (xi) of Prop. 3), which does not be-
long to the greatest logic on the second level,K∆ (because s∆M /∈ Th∆(Fmcn)
by item (vii) of Prop. 3).
5. ECZ∆ ⊆ R∆ andECNZ∆ ⊆ K∆, even though the corresponding inclusions
of -logics do not hold (because ϕ → ¬ϕ is not provable in K and thus in
R). This can be easily seen from the axiomatizations:
ECZ
∆ = E∆ +∆C andR∆ = E∆ +∆C+∆M;
ECNZ
∆ = E∆ +∆C+∆N andK∆ = E∆ +∆C+∆N+∆M.
6. It may be interesting to compareK∆ with Kuhn’s minimal non-contingency lo-
gicK∆ [12].7 It turns out that the two logics are equivalent, since∆ϕ↔ ∆¬ϕ
(our axiom∆Equ) is provable inK∆, by using∆¬ϕ→ ∆ϕ (denotedA1 there)
and classical propositional calculus (denoted PL there and TAUT here) and re-
placement of equivalents for∆ (denotedRE there and RE∆ here), and∆⊤ (our
6Consider a frame F = 〈S,N〉 where S = {s, t} and N(s) = {{s}} and N(t) = ∅. It can be easily
seen that F is a (c)-frame. However, its complementation is not: on one hand, from {s} ∈ N(s) it follows
that {s} ∈ Nz(s) and {t} ∈ Nz(s); on the other hand, because ∅ /∈ N(s) and S /∈ N(s), we have
∅ = {s} ∩ {t} /∈ Nz(s).
7Kuhn miswrote K∆ on p. 231 as K4∆. This was pointed out by George Schumm in the review of
[12], see [13].
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axiom∆N) is interderivable with Kuhn’s inference rule
ϕ
∆ϕ
(denotedR∆ there)
due to replacement of equivalents for∆.
7. The axiomatization of the logic of the form LZ∆ can be obtained by simply
taking the axiomatization ofL and replacing everywherewith∆. In particular,
we obtain∆ϕ↔ ∆¬ϕ. This is because any logic with Z hasϕ↔ (ϕ∨¬ϕ)
(¬ϕ → ϕ can be derived from Z by using classical propositional calculus
and replacement of equivalents for , RE), that is, ϕ ↔ ∆ϕ. Semantically,
this can be explained by the fact that Fz  ϕ↔ ∆ϕ.
5 Reflection: how does the function λ arise?
As noted, in order to show the completeness of proof systems including∆M, a crucial
part is to define a suitable canonical function, i.e. NΛ, which is inspired by the func-
tion λ in [12]. The λ is very important for the definition of canonical relation and thus
for the completeness proof in the cited paper. It is this function that helps find simple
axiomatization for the minimal contingency logic under Kripke semantics, so to speak,
since we can obtain his axiomatization from the truth lemma proof, whichever axioms
or rules needed are added. Despite its importance, the author did not say any intuit-
ive idea about λ. And this function was thought of as ‘ingenious’ creation by some
other researchers, say Humberstone [10, p. 118]8 and Fan, Wang and van Ditmarch [8,
p. 101]. But how does the function arise? In this section, we unfold the mystery of λ,
and show that it is actually equal to a related function λ proposed in Humberstone [9].
To show completeness of minimal contingency logic under Kripke semantics, Hum-
berstone [9, p. 219] defined the canonical relation Rc as xRcy iff λ(x) ⊆ y, where,
denoted by H’s λ,
λ(x) = {ϕ | ∆ϕ ∈ x and ∀ψ such that ⊢ ϕ→ ψ,∆ψ ∈ x}.9
The reason for defining the function λ in such a way, is that the author would like to
‘simulate’ the canonical relation of the minimal modal logic, which is defined via xRy
iff λ(x) ⊆ y, where λ(x) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ x}. This can be seen from several passages:
The intuitive idea is that for x ∈W , λ(x) is the set of formulas which are necessary
at x. We think of λ(x) as a “labeling” of all formulas A such that ∆A ∈ x, labeling
each such formula asNecessary (recorded by puttingA into λ(x)) or else as Impossible
(putting ¬A into λ(x)).
· · ·
The idea of the entry condition on A, that only such A (with ∆A ∈ x) should be
labeled as Necessary if all their consequences are non-contingent, is that · · · , those
8Although [11, p. 1279] states “This simplifies a definition from Humberstone [9], p. 221f.”, this wording
leaves it open whether Kuhn’s λ is the same function as Humberstone’s λ, or a different one. In fact,
by personal communication, Humberstone has confirmed that he had not explicitly considered this question
before seeing a draft of of the current paper settling it in favor of the first alternative — that what is simplified
is the way the function is picked out rather than which function is picked out.
9In the definition of λ, Humberstone used A and B rather than ϕ and ψ, respectively. To maintain the
consistency of notation in this paper, we here use ϕ and ψ instead.
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non-contingencies which qualify as such because they, rather than their negations, are
necessary and have only non-contingent consequences, since those consequences are
themselves necessary. [9, p. 219]
Then the function λ was simplified, and accordingly, the completeness proof was
simplified in [12]. There, λ(x), denoted by K’s λ, is defined as:
λ(x) = {ϕ | ∀ψ,∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x}.
In the sequel, we will demonstrate that, in fact, K’s λ is equal to H’s λ.
To begin with, notice that ⊢ ϕ → ϕ, thus the part following ‘and’ in the H’s λ
definition entails∆ϕ ∈ x. Therefore, the H’s λ(x) is equal to a simplified version:
λ(x) = {ϕ | ∀ψ such that ⊢ ϕ→ ψ,∆ψ ∈ x}.
Then it is sufficient to show that the simplified λ is further equal to K’s λ, even in
the setting of arbitrary neighborhood contingency logics (as opposed to Kripke contin-
gency logics).
Proposition 25. Let x be a maximal consistent set. Given the rule RE∆, the following
statements are equivalent.10
(1) For every ψ such that ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, ∆ψ ∈ x.
(2) For every ψ,∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x.
Proof. (1) =⇒ (2): suppose (1) holds. Since ⊢ ϕ → ϕ ∨ ψ, then it is immediate by
(1) that ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x, namely (2).
(2) =⇒ (1): suppose (2) holds, to show (1). For this, assume that ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then
⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ ↔ ψ, by RE∆, ⊢ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ ∆ψ. By (2), we obtain that ∆ψ ∈ x, as
desired.
6 Concluding Discussions
In this paper, by defining suitable neighborhood canonical functions, we presented a
family of contingency logics under neighborhood semantics. In particular, inspired by
Kuhn’s function λ in [12], we defined a desired canonical neighborhood function, and
then axiomatized monotone contingency logic and regular contingency logic and other
logics including the axiom ∆M, thereby answering two open questions raised in [1].
We then reflected on the function λ, and showed that it is actually equal to Humber-
stone’s function λ in [9], even in the setting of arbitrary neighborhood contingency
logics.
Moreover, as we show in Appendix, in M∆, ∆M can be replaced by ∆ϕ →
∆(ϕ→ ψ)∨∆(¬ϕ→ χ), and inR∆,∆C can be replaced by∆(ψ → ϕ)∧∆(¬ψ →
ϕ)→ ∆ϕ. Thus we can also adopt these two alternative formulas to axiomatize mono-
tone contingency logic and regular contingency logic. Therefore, it was wrong to claim
that “This raises the questions of what the axiomatizations are of monotone contin-
gency logic and regular contingency logic. · · · one cannot fill these gaps with the
10RE∆ is just (∆Cong) in [9].
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axioms∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ→ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ → χ) and∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧∆(¬ψ → ϕ)→ ∆ϕ. So
these questions remain open.” on [1, p. 62] and [2, pp. 124–125]. Also, we answer the
two open questions therein.
Recall that an ‘almost definability’ schema, ∇χ → (ϕ ↔ (∆ϕ ∧∆(χ → ϕ))),
is proposed in [7], and shown in [8] to be applied to axiomatize contingency logic
over much more Kripke frame classes than Kuhn’s function λ and other variations.
Therefore, it may be natural to ask if the schema can also work in the neighborhood
setting. The canonical neighborhood function inspired by the schema seems to be
N(s) = {|ϕ| | ∆ϕ ∧∆(ψ → ϕ) ∈ s for some∇ψ ∈ s}.
Unfortunately the answer seems to be negative. The reason can be explained as follows.
Although NΛ in Def. 10 is almost monotonic in the sense that if |ϕ| ∈ NΛ(s) and
|ϕ| ⊆ |ψ|, then |ψ| ∈ NΛ(s), as can be easily seen from the proof of Lemma 15, in
contrast, as one may easily verify, N is not almost monotonic in the above sense, i.e.,
it fails that if |ϕ| ∈ N(s) and |ϕ| ⊆ |ψ|, then |ψ| ∈ N(s). This can also explain
why NΛ works well for systems extendingM∆. Despite this fact, this NΛ does not
apply to systems excluding the axiom ∆M, since we need this axiom to ensure the
truth lemma (Lemma 12). It is also worth noting that thisNΛ is smaller than that in the
case of classical contingency logic (Def. 5), thus we cannot address all neighborhood
contingency logics in a unified way.11 This indicates that the completeness proofs of
these logics are nontrivial. Besides, NΛ seems not workable for proper extensions of
K
∆, which we leave for future work.
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Appendix
Recall that ∆M stands for ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ), and ∆C stands for ∆ϕ ∧
∆ψ → ∆(ϕ∧ψ). And in the Conclusion section (Sec. 6), we claim that “inM∆,∆M
can be replaced by ∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ → ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ → χ) (denoted by ∆M′), and in R∆,
∆C can be replaced by ∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧∆(¬ψ → ϕ) → ∆ϕ (denoted by ∆C′)”. In this
appendix, we verify this claim, that is,
(1) E∆ +∆M = E∆ +∆M′,
and
(2) M∆ +∆C =M∆ +∆C′.
It is straightforward to show (1), by using only TAUT, ∆Equ, MP and RE∆. For
(2), the ‘⊇’ part, that is, ∆C′ is provable inM∆ +∆C, is easy, shown as follows.
(i) ∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧∆(¬ψ → ϕ)→ ∆((ψ → ϕ) ∧ (¬ψ → ϕ)) ∆C
(ii) (ψ → ϕ) ∧ (¬ψ → ϕ)↔ ϕ TAUT
(iii) ∆((ψ → ϕ) ∧ (¬ψ → ϕ))↔ ∆ϕ (ii),RE∆
(iv) ∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧∆(¬ψ → ϕ)→ ∆ϕ (i), (iii),MP
The ‘⊆’ part, that is, ∆C is provable inM∆ +∆C′, is harder.
(i) ∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∨∆(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ∆M
(ii) ∆ψ → ∆(ψ ∨ ¬ϕ) ∨∆(¬ψ ∨ ¬ϕ) ∆M
(iii) ∆(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)↔ ∆(¬ψ ∨ ¬ϕ) TAUT,RE∆
(iv) ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ∨ (∆(ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∧∆(ψ ∨ ¬ϕ)) (i)− (iii)
(v) ∆(ψ ∨ ¬ϕ)↔ ∆(¬ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) TAUT,RE∆
(vi) ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ∨ (∆(ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∧∆(¬ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) (iv), (v)
(vii) ∆(ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ))↔ ∆(¬ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) TAUT,RE∆
(viii) ∆(¬ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ∆(ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) TAUT,RE∆
(ix) ∆(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)↔ ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∆Equ
(x) ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (∆(¬ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∧∆(ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ))) (vi)− (ix)
(xi) ∆(¬ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∧∆(ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ))→ ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∆C′
(xii) ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) (x), (xi)
18
